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as one of the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. The protection of the family is
engaged by the deportation of domiciled aliens because, by definition, these deportees have been in Canada
for a long period of time and have fully assimilated into Canadian society: deportation will, therefore, have an
adverse impact on the aliens' family life and their children. Indeed, the adverse effect of deportation on
families and children is increasingly recognized, by courts and commentators, as a violation of internationally
protected human rights. If the Canadian Charter is interpreted consistently with the growing body of law
surrounding these international human rights, a compelling case can be made against the power of the State to
deport domiciled aliens from Canada.
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THE CANADIAN CHARTER AND
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
REDEFINING THE STATE'S POWER
TO DEPORT ALIENSO
BY DANIELA BASSAN*
This article considers the relationship between
international and domestic law in deportation
proceedings. The argument is made that, generally,
Canadian law should be interpreted consistently with
Canada's obligations at international law, as reflected
in conventions and custom. More specifically, the
article proposes that Canada's obligation at
international law to protect the family and the child be
recognized in Canadian law as one of the principles of
fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. The
protection of the family is engaged by the deportation
of domiciled aliens because, by definition, these
deportees have been in Canada for a long period of
time and have fully assimilated into Canadian society:
deportation will, therefore, have an adverse impact on
the aliens' family life and their children. Indeed, the
adverse effect of deportation on families and children is
increasingly recognized, by courts and commentators,
as a violation of internationally protected human rights.
If the Canadian Charter is interpreted consistently with
the growing body of law surrounding these
international human rights, a compelling case can be
made against the power of the State to deport
domiciled aliens from Canada.
Cet article examine le rapport entre le droit
international etle droit interne quant l'expulsion des
6trangers. Gtn6ralement, l'interprdtation du droit
canadien devrait atre en conformit6 avec les
engagements assumes par le Canada en droit
international public et coutumier. L'article precise que
le Canada devrait honorer ses engagements
internationaux tout en reconnaissantla protection de la
famille et de 'enfant comme un des principes de justice
fondamentale en vertu de l'article 7 de la Charte. La
protection de la famille survient lors de l'expulsion d'un
6tranger int~gr6, c-est- -dire, on 6tranger qui se trouve
as Canada depuis longtemps et qui s'est int~gr6 dans la
soci~t6 canadienne. II est 6vident que 'expulsion des
6trangers int~gres a un impact n~gatif sur leur vie
familiale et sur leurs enfants. D'ailleurs, cette
cons6quence est consid6rde par les tribunaux et la
doctrine comme une violation des droits de la personne
lesquels sont explicitement reconnus en droit
international. L'interpr6tation de la Charte
canadienne, en conformit6 avec ces droits de la
personne garantis en droit international, s'oppose au
pouvoir de l'ttat d'expulser des 6trangers inttgr~s do
Canada.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988 Mr. Justice G6rard La Forest of the Supreme Court of
Canada spoke at the Conference of the Canadian Council on
International Law and made the following observations:
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Until the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomsl in 1982, our courts
resolved the disputes that came before them almost solely by reference to the statutes
and case law of Canada and England. Only the most limited reliance was placed on other
Commonwealth or American sources, and virtually never did our courts stray further
than this. The Charter changed all this. In the last six years the Supreme Court of
Canada has become one of, if not the most, cosmopolitan of national courts in terms of
the sources to which we have turned in dealing with the appeals that come before us 2
Indeed, the use of international materials in the Charter era was
inevitable given the legislative history of the Charter. Most of the rights
and freedoms protected in the Charter are also contained in
international human rights instruments: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Social Economic
and Cultural Rights, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the
European Convention on Human Rights were particularly influential in
the drafting of the Charter.3
However, to make full use of international law in constitutional
litigation, mere awareness of the phenomenon described by La Forest J.
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 G.V. La Forest, "The Use of International and Foreign Material in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (Proceedings of the 1988 Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law,
Ottawa, 1988) 230 at 230.
3 A. Bayefsky & M. Cohen, "Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law"
(1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 265 at 271-73.
The following are treaties to which Canada is a State Party and to which references in this
article are made: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with Optional Protocol, 19
December 1966, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 [hereinafter IccPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Cultural and Social Rights, 16 December 1966, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46 [hereinafter ICECSR];
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 7 March i966,
Can. T.S. 1970 No. 28 [hereinafter ICERD]; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July
1951, Can. T.S. No. 6 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Convention on the Rights of the Child (with
Reservations and Statement of Understanding), 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3; and Charter
of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 [hereinafter uN Charter].
Resolutions supported by Canada and referred to in this article: Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc.A/810 (1948) at
71 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; Organization of American States, American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, OR OEA/Ser.LIV/II.23/, doc.21 rev.6 (1948) [hereinafter American
Declaration]; and Declaration on the Rights of the Child, UNGA Res. 1386, UN GAOR, 14th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16 at 19, UN Doc. A/4354 (1959) at 19.
Treaties to which Canada is not a State Party and are referred to in this article: European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, Eur.
T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, OAS T.S. No.
36, 9 I.L.M. 673 [hereinafter American Convention]; African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 59 [hereinafter African Charter]; and International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 18 December 1990, The United
Nations and Human Rightsl945-1995 (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1995) at 383
(not yet in force) [hereinafter Convention on Migrant Workers and Their Families].
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is not enough. Rather, it is necessary first, to understand the theoretical
justification for introducing international law in Charter cases and
second, to consider the persuasive impact international law may have in
a given context.
The purpose of this article is also twofold. First, the relationship
between international and domestic law will be examined from a
theoretical perspective. Various theories surrounding the
implementation of international law are canvassed. Special
consideration is given to the use of international human rights law (as set
out in treaties and custom) in the general context of domestic Charter
litigation. Second, this article applies the theory developed in Part II to
a specific context, where both domestic and international law meet via
the Charter. The context chosen for this article is immigration law, and
more specifically, the expulsion or deportation of aliens by a State.
Deportation, meaning "the removal of a person from a State by its
unilateral act,"4 is an inherently international issue since it necessarily
involves relations between sovereign States, namely the expelling State,
in which the alien resides, and the home State, where the expelled alien
originated. The expelling State is asserting its sovereignty by removing
the alien from its borders while the State of origin is obliged to receive
"on its territory such of its nationals as are not allowed to remain on the
territory of other states."S However, as Parts III-V of this analysis
indicate, both domestic law and international law restrict the exercise of
the deportation power such that it cannot be arbitrary or unjust, or
carried out in an unfair manner. In the domestic context, Charter
challenges have arisen where domiciled aliens, i.e., immigrants who have
been in Canada for a long period of time and assimilated themselves
with Canadian society, have been ordered deported. The Charter
challenges have, for the most, been based on alleged violations of liberty
and security of the person. Nonetheless, these domestic challenges have
been largely unsuccessful, whereas in the international context, and
particularly in Europe, a growing body of law suggests that the
deportation of domiciled aliens will, more often than not, violate
internationally protected human rights. These rights, as set out in
numerous conventions, relate to the protection of families and children
at international law and weigh against the deportation of domiciled
aliens. As a result, for those persons facing deportation from Canada,
there is a compelling argument that domestic constitutional law should
4 Sir R. Jennings & Sir A. Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, vol. 1, 9th ed. (Harlow,
U.K.: Longman, 1992) at 940, note 1 [hereinafter Oppenheim].
5 Ibid. at 857.
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be interpreted consistently with this growing body of international law.
However, before considering the issues surrounding deportation, the
theoretical underpinnings of the analysis must be established.
II. NATIONAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. General Principles
The relationship between international and domestic law, as
defined by Canadian courts, will vary with the source of international law
in question.6 Generally, where a rule of customary international law is
being considered, the "adoption" theory applies. This means that a rule
of custom is automatically incorporated into domestic law without an act
of incorporation (unless there is a conflict with statutory law or with
established principles of the common law).7 Where conventional
international law is concerned, the "transformation" approach is taken.
That is, to become part of the law of Canada, a treaty must be
implemented by domestic legislation.8
B. Customary International Law
Assuming that the adoption theory applies in Canada, its
application depends on the ability of domestic courts to successfully
identify the existence of an international rule of custom. The Supreme
Court of Canada held in Reference Re Newfoundland Continental Shelf'
6 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (see UN Charter, supra note 3)
identifies the following as sources of international law: "international conventions" (art. 38(1)(a));
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" (art. 38(1)(b)); and
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (art. 38(1)(c)). Article 38(1)(d) indicates
that "judicial decisions" and the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations" are "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." With regard to art. 38(1)(a),
note that the term "treaty" is used interchangeably with other terms such as "convention,"
"Charter," "protocol," and "covenant" to indicate an international agreement. See International
Law Commission, [1966] Y.B.I.LC. II at 188.
7 This theory was approved by Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corporation LtcL v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881 at 889 (C.A.).
8 See generally, on this topic, H.M. Kindred et aL, International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and
Applied in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993) at 147-48; and A. Bayefsky,
"International Law in Canadian Courts" (Canadian Council on International Law, XIXth Annual
Conference, Ottawa, 1990) 273 at 274.
9 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86.
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that international custom is evidenced by "substantial uniformity or
consistency, and general acceptance."10 This is a restatement of the
general rule that customary international law is created by two
conditions: 1) sufficient and settled state practice; and 2) opinio jurisa
subjective element whereby states "must feel that they are conforming to
what amounts to a legal obligation."11 Proof of state practice can be
found in "treaties, decisions of international and national courts,
national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national
legal advisors, and the practice of international organizations." 12 Once a
rule of international custom is identified, the adoption theory dictates
that domestic law (where the common law is unclear and statutory
provisions are ambiguous) be interpreted consistently with the
customary rule.
C. Conventional International Law to which Canada is a Parly
In accordance with the division of powers between the federal
and provincial governments of Canada under the Constitution Act
1867,13 the power to implement treaties is arguably shared by both
governments. According to the Privy Council's holding in the Labour
Conventions Case,14 if the subject matter of the treaty falls under
provincial jurisdiction the federal Parliament cannot enact legislation to
implement the treaty. Although this case has not been expressly
overruled, its authority has been questioned in a number of subsequent
cases.15 However, regardless of whether or not there exists a federal
treaty-implementing power, there is the further problem of determining
exactly what will constitute implementing legislation. On the one hand,
10 Ibid. at 118.
11 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and Federal
Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 77.
12 Bayefsky & Cohen, supra note 3 at 284.
13 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
14 A.G. (Canada) v.A.G. (Ontario), [1937] A.C. 326.
15 See MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 [hereinafter Vapor Canada] (held
that s. 7 of the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13) did not implement
the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property); Schneider v. R., [1982] 2 S.C.R.
112 (held that the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. N-I) did not
implement the Single Convention on Narcotics Control); and R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd.,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 [hereinafter Crown Zellerbach] (held that the Ocean Dumping Control Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-2 implemented the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and other Matter).
[VOL 34 No. 3
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there is authority for the proposition that legislation which implements a
treaty must contain an express declaration that it is giving effect to
Canada's international obligations.1 6 On the other hand, a relaxed
standard also exists whereby the absence of an express declaration may
not prevent a court from holding that the legislation in question was
meant to implement treaty obligations. 17
In addition to the rule that only implemented treaties are part of
domestic law, there is a common law presumption that Parliament will
not "legislate in breach of a treaty or in any manner inconsistent with the
comity of nations and the established rules of international law."1 8
Consequently, Canadian courts will construct implementing legislation
consistently with the treaty or convention in question. However, where
there is a conflict between domestic law and the treaty, the former
prevails. An additional qualification to the presumption is that an
international convention will be consulted for interpretive purposes only
where the court first finds an "ambiguity, either patent or latent"19 in the
domestic implementing legislation.20 However, authority also exists
whereby reference to an international agreement can be made without a
preliminary finding of ambiguity in the implementing legislation.21
Even in the absence of implementing legislation, it is still
presumed that Canada's legislators will not legislate in violation of
Canada's international legal obligations. However, since the
unimplemented treaty is not a part of the domestic law, there may be a
16 Vapor Canada, supra note 15 at 169-72.
17 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 15 at 408. (In considering the question of implementation, the
court looked at the similarity in the language of the domestic law with that of the Convention and
the connection between changes to the domestic law and changes to the Convention). Bayefsky,
supra note 8 at 275, argues that the requirement for an express reference to a treaty in implementing
legislation is reasonable only in cases where federal implementing legislation infringes on provincial
jurisdiction.
18 Daniels v. P., [1968] S.C.R. 517 at 541. This presumption applies equally with respect to
customary international law. See also Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1966] 3 All
E.R. 871 at 874 (C.A.), Denning, LJ.
19 Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Commission, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1092 at 1098 [hereinafter
Schavernoch].
2 0 Ibid. The Schavemoch approach was affirmed in Capital Cities Communications Inc. v.
cRTc, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 at 173 in which Laskin C.J., writing for the majority, refused to resort to
the unimplemented Inter-American Communications Convention 1937 for the purposes of
interpreting the Broadcasting Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. B-9) because there was
no ambiguity in the domestic law.
21 National Corn Growers Association v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324,
Gonthier J.
1996]
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stronger requirement of finding "patent ambiguity"22 in domestic law
before courts resort to the treaty for interpretive purposes.
D. Conventional International Law to which Canada is not a Party
Canadian courts can also make use of international conventions
to which Canada is not a Party. Such non-binding treaty law, often
closely resembling conventions to which Canada is a Party, becomes an
additional tool for interpreting domestic law.23 However, the role of
such non-binding treaties is likely less persuasive than the role played by
those agreements which have been ratified by Canada.24
E. Charter and International Law
1. Charter and custom
Given that the Charter is "indissoluably linked by language and
ideology to important international instruments and principles to which
Canada subscribes," 2S the resort to international sources of law is
inevitable if it is to be interpreted "properly." Further, assuming that
the adoption theory applies, customary international human rights law
has significant potential to define the scope of rights and freedoms
constitutionally entrenched in the Charter. Support for the proposition
that the Charter should be interpreted consistently with norms of
international custom, in the realm of human rights, is found in section 26
of the Charter: "The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and
freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other
rights or freedoms that exist in Canada." Thus, as Bayefsky and Cohen
have argued,26 this section gives constitutional protection to any rights
and freedoms of customary international law, which, under an adoption
theory "exist in Canada." Further support for this argument comes from
22 Baysfsky, supra note 8 at 277.
23 Bayefsky & Cohen, supra note 3 at 301.
24 Ibid. at 308-09.
2 5 Ibid. at 267.
2 6 Ibid. at 280.
[VOL. 34 No. 3
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the United States, which also favours incorporation of customary
international law as part of its "supreme federal law."27
In order to use custom as a means of interpreting Charter rights,
the courts must still solve the problem of proving that the international
custom exists. To assist in the determination of whether a right has
achieved status as a customary norm of international law, the decisions
of national and international courts may be considered. Among the
human rights judicially recognized as customary international law are:
freedom from torture,28 freedom from prolonged arbitrary detention,29
freedom from arbitrary imprisonment,30 freedom from slavery,31 and
freedom from racial discrimination 3 2 Once identified, the custom can
be used to fill in the gaps in unsettled areas of the common law and give
meaning to ambiguous statutory provisions33
2. Charter and international conventions to which Canada is a party
Despite the theoretical distinctions that can be made between
implemented and unimplemented treaties and the various justifications
given for consulting treaties, judicial use of international law in Charter
cases has tended to ignore these technical principles. Rather, the dissent
of Dickson C.J. in Reference Re Public Service Employees Relations Act34
establishes the legal justification for using conventional international law
in interpreting the Charter:
[T}he similarity between the policies and provisions of the Charter and those of
international human rights documents attaches considerable relevance to interpretations
of those documents by adjudicative bodies, in much the same way that decisions of the
United States courts under the Bill of Rights, or decisions of the courts of other
27 In The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 at 700 (1900), the Supreme Court held that
customary international law is part of domestic law to be applied by domestic courts. See also, R.B.
Lillich, "The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law" (1990) 3 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 53 at 70.
2 8 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 at 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
29 Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 at 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
30 Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 at 1388 (10th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
31 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3 at 32.
32 Ibid.
33 P.J. Duffy, "English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights" (1980) 29
I.C.L.Q. 585 at 599.
34 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Public Service Employees Reference].
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jurisdictions are relevant and may be persuasive. The relevance of these documents in
Charter interpretation extends beyond the standards developed by adjudicative bodies
under the documents to the documents themselves.... Furthermore, Canada is a party to
a number of international human rights Conventions which contain provisions similar or
identical to those in the Charter. Canada has thus obliged itself internationally to ensure
within its borders the protection of certain fundamental rights and freedoms which arc
also contained in the Charter.... I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to
provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international
human rights documents which Canada has ratified.35
However, the scope of these comments was restricted in an important
way as Dickson C.J. continued:
In short, though I do not believe that the judiciary is bound by the norms of international
law in interpreting the Charter, these norms provide a relevant and persuasive source for
the interpretation of the provisions of the Charter, especially when they arise out of
Canada's international obligations under human rights conventions. 36
The legitimacy and apparent limitations, of using international
conventional law was reaffirmed by Dickson C.J., this time writing for
the majority, in Davidson v. Slaight Communications Inc.37 No mention
is made in these passages-which set the ground rules for judicial
treatment of international law in Charter litigation 38-of the presence or
absence of implementing legislation. The reason for this may be that
although Canada has ratified a large number of important international
human rights conventions, there is no federal or provincial statute,
including the Charter itself, which expressly implements them.3 9
Although some have argued that the Charter implements by
"implication" the provisions of various human rights treaties to which
Canada is a Party,4O judicial treatment of the question suggests that
3 5 Ibid. at 348-49 [emphasis added].
3 6 Ibid. at 349-50.
3 7 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056 [hereinafter Davidson].
38 See La Forest, supra note 2 at 232.
39 See W.A. Schabas, International Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter (Toronto:
Carswell, 1992) at 20.
40 See Bayefsky & Cohen, supra note 3 at 303-05 where it is argued that certain provisions of
the Charter may be construed, by comparing the language of the Charter with that of an
international convention, as implementing legislation. For example, s. 15(1) of the Charter, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of enumerated grounds, could be seen as implementing art. 26
of the ICCPR, supra note 3, which prohibits, in a more open-ended manner, "any" discrimination.
Thus, by considering s. 15(1) as giving effect to the ICCPR, courts may interpret the listed grounds of
discrimination in s. 15(1) as exemplary and not exhaustive.
[VOL. 34 No. 3
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international human rights conventions are unimplemented, yet very
useful aids in interpreting Charter rights and freedoms. 41
As such, the role of international law in Charter jurisprudence
should not be underestimated. Despite the lack of comment on the issue
of implementation of human rights treaties, the courts have not imposed
a pre-requisite finding of "ambiguity" before resorting to the text of
international documents. 42 Indeed the "references to Canadian human
rights treaties [by Canadian courts] have generally been unprincipled,
and therefore unpredictable." 43 Thus, the willingness to consider
international conventional law is not impeded by the constitutional rule
that unimplemented treaties are not part of the domestic law of Canada
and therefore "non-binding." Rather, the common law presumption
that Canada's legislators do not intend to violate the country's
international obligations still operates implicitly through Dickson C.J.'s
comments in Public Service Employees Reference and Davidson. This
explains the frequent and consistent use by the Supreme Court of
Canada of the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration in the context of
interpreting rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.44
3. Charter and international conventions to which Canada is not a party
It is not surprising that, in a judicial setting which invites
consideration of foreign legal materials, Canadian courts have also made
frequent use of international conventions to which Canada is not a Party.
41 Since the Charter came into effect in 1982 the only case finding that a convention on
international human rights was implicitly implemented is arguably Singh v. Canada (Employment
and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter Singh]. In that case Wilson J. writing for two
other members of the court, approved of Pigeon J.'s dissent in Ernewein v. Canada (Employment
and Immigration), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 639 at 658, in which he wrote: "It will be seen that the provisions
of the Convention [Relating to the Status of Refugees] were adopted and became part of the law of
Canada by being thus referred to in an Act of Parliament [now the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
1-2]."
Further, in R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, Dickson C.J. (although he did not go as far as
holding that domestic criminal legislation was an express implementation of international
conventional law) did write at 754: "Canada, along with other members of the international
commuity, has indicated [in the ICCPR and ICERD] a commitment to prohibiting hate propaganda,
and in my opinion this Court must have regard to that commitment in investigating the nature of
the government objective behind s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code [R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46]."
42 Bayefsky, supra note 8 at 277.
43 Ibid.
44 La Forest, supra note 2 at 233-34.
19961
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In fact, some 85 per cent of the Supreme Court of Canada references to
international human rights law are in relation to the ECHR, and the
jurisprudence associated with it.45 The relevance of considering the
ECHR is clear:
The European Convention is the forerunner of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the latter duplicating many of its terms. The sophisticated quasi-judicial and
judicial system associated with the European Convention and not with the Covenant
makes the jurisprudence of the European Convention helpful in understanding Canada's
obligations under the Covenant. Furthermore, much of Canadian legal tradition is
inherited from the United Kingdom. That state is itself a party to the European
Convention and the Convention has been used in British courts to interpret British law.46
The use of United States judicial decisions by Canadian courts
interpreting constitutional protections is even more extensive than the
use of European sources.47 The American jurisprudence is useful as it
provides a "framework for analysis"48 but, because of the fundamental
differences between Canadian and American societies and legal
traditions, the American experience cannot be seen as a "master in the
development of Charter jurisprudence." 49
In addition to the general relationship that international human
rights law has with the purpose and objectives of the Charter, there are
specific provisions in the Charter which invite consideration of foreign
legal sources. Sections 1 and 7 of the Charter are such provisions, both
of which are discussed in Part III.
III. DEPORTATION: CASE STUDY
The general theory behind the use of international law in Charter
litigation serves as the necessary backdrop for the "deportation case
study" of this article. That is, to properly consider the ways in which
international human rights law can be used to challenge a deportation
proceeding under the Charter, it is necessary to understand how and why
international legal materials are utilized by Canadian courts. In the
context of deportation, it is necessary first, to consider the governing
domestic legislation (i.e., the Immigration Act). Second, the analysis will
45 Bayefsky, supra note 8 at 279.
46 1bid at 279-80, note 16.
4 7 La Forest, supra note 2 at 236.
48 Ibid. at 240.
49 Ibid. at 237.
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deal almost exclusively with the special problems raised by the
deportation of domiciled aliens (i.e., aliens who have been in Canada,
legally as permanent residents or illegally without status, for long periods
of time and have developed significant ties with the jurisdiction). Third,
the analysis will be contained under section 7 of the Charter and the
related Canadian jurisprudence. Fourth, the unsettled and, arguably,
restrictive aspects of Canadian law in the area of deportation will be
addressed, by considering more expansive approaches adopted by other
courts and jurisdictions in the international community. It is the last
part of the analysis which serves as the focus of this article.50
A. Domestic Law and Deportation
1. Immigration Act, common law, and deportation
Deportation, a term which is often substituted for expulsion,
involves "the exercise of State power which secures the removal, either
'voluntary,' under threat of forcible removal, or forcibly, of an alien from
the territory of a State."51 Aliens are distinguished from nationals or
citizens; the former are received by a State as a matter of discretion
whereas the latter have the right to remain in the State.52 Thus, only
aliens and not citizens are subject to deportation. 53 Deportation must
also be distinguished from exclusion, which is the refusal to allow an
alien to enter a State.54
50 For a discussion on the domestic law regarding the deportation of permanent residents see
R.P. Cohen, "Fundamental (In)Justice: The Deportation of Long-term Residents from Canada"
(1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ. 457.
51 G.S. Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement of Persons Between States (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1978) at 201.
52 Oppenheim, supra note 4 at 896-99. Nationality is the chief link between individuals and
international law; it is the means by which protection is afforded by states to individuals.
Nationality can be acquired by birth, naturalization, reintegration, annexation, and cession. In the
Commonwealth, nationality, as it regards citizenship, is of primary relevance in international law (at
851-81).
53 A citizen can nonetheless be extradited pursuant to an extradition treaty in which one State
agrees to have a person within its borders sent to another State where that person was allegedly
involved in criminal activity. See Kindred et aL, supra note 8 at 472-73.
54 Oppenheim, supra note 4 at 940, note 2.
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Under section 32(2) of the Immigration Act, a permanent
residentSS shall be deported if the alien falls into any of the categories set
out in section 27(1). The various categories include a person who has
committed certain offences in Canada or abroad,5 6 engaged in
subversive political activityS 7 obtained landing by way of false
documentation or information,5 8 or wilfully failed to be
self-supporting 5 9 Although all permanent residents can appeal a
deportation order on legal or factual grounds, not all are entitled to be
heard on equitable grounds of appeal.60 Further, a domiciled alien who
has been in Canada on a long-term basis but without legal status is not
entitled to appeal a deportation order on any grounds.61 Thus, for many
domiciled aliens, statutory appeal procedures are inadequate and/or
non-existent. Extending constitutional protections to domiciled aliens
would overcome any such statutory deficiencies.
Nonetheless, support for the domestic legislation is rooted in the
principles of the common law which survive the Charter era as indicated
by La Forest J. in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice)62:
The government has the right and duty to keep out and expel aliens from this country if it
considers it advisable to do so. This right, of course, exists independently of extradition.
If an alien known to have a serious criminal record attempted to enter into Canada, lie
could be refused admission. And by the same token, he could be deported once he
entered Canada. 63
55 Section 2(1) of the Immigration Act, supra note 41, provides that a permanent resident is a
person who a) has been granted landing, b) has not become a Canadian citizen, and c) has not
ceased to be a permanent resident.
5 6 Ibid., s. 27(1)(d).
5 7 Ibi(L, s. 27(1)(a).
581iaS, s. 27(1)(e).
59 Ibid-, s. 27(1)(f)
.
60 Ibid., s. 70(1)(a) allows permanent residents to appeal a deportation order on grounds of
fact and/or law. Section 70(1)(b) provides for an appeal on compassionate grounds, namely "having
regard to all the circumstances of the case" the permanent resident should not be deported.
However, s. 70(4) provides that for certain persons ordered deported a s. 70(1)(b) appeal is not
permitted. Such persons include individuals to whom a security certificate has been issued pursuant
to s. 40.1(1) and persons responsible for human rights abuses or terrorist activity.
61 Ibid., s.32(7) does provide however, that a departure order can be substituted for a
deportation order in respect of s. 27(2) aliens (Le., visitors who have overstayed).
62 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
63 Ibid. at 834.
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In Singh, it was held that "[a]t common law an alien has no right to enter
or remain in Canada except by leave of the Crown."64
2. Charter and deportation
The common law position distinguishing between aliens and
citizens, with regard to mobility rights, is reinforced by section 6 of the
Charter:
6(1) Everycitizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.
6(2) Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident
of Canada has the right
(a) to move and take up residence in any province; and.
(b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.
Nonetheless, the fundamental and legal rights in the Charter (sections 2
and 7 to 14) are extended to "everyone." In the immigration context
these rights are often invoked by aliens who have been ordered to leave
the country. The status of aliens claiming protection against deportation
from Canada can vary, and different concerns arise depending on
whether the person is a refugee claimant,65 permanent resident,66 or
permanent resident seeking new status as a refugee.6 7 For the purposes
of the discussion that follows, emphasis will be placed on domiciled
aliens, including permanent residents, ordered deported, but reference
will be made on occasion to other categories of aliens.
Challenges have been made, albeit unsuccessfully, by aliens
facing deportation from Canada. The challenges made under various
provisions of the Charter include section 11(h) (the right not to be tried
64 Supra note 41 at 189. See also R v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] 2 All E.R. 741
(C.A.) and Prata v. Canada (Manpower and Immigration), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 376 in favour of this
common law position.
65 Singh, supra note 41 held that a refugee claimant has the right to an oral hearing in
accordance with the procedural requirements of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.
66 Chiarelli v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 [hereinafter
Chiareli] held that it is not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter to deport a permanent resident
convicted of serious offences.
67 Grewal v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 581 (C.A.) held that it is
not a violation of s. 7 of the Charter to order the deportation of a permanent resident whose
subsequent refugee claim was denied.
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and punished for an offence more than once); 68 section 12 (the right not
to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment); 69 and section 15 (the
right to equal protection and benefit of the law).70 The most commonly
used section in challenging a deportation order under the Immigration
Act is, however, section 7 of the Charter7l which states:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The jurisprudence in this area of domestic immigration law is
inconsistent in many respects and, as argued in Part IV, there is
guidance to be found in international law.72 But with regard to the
domestic position, under section 7 of the Charter, aliens have argued that
deportation violates their right to life, liberty, or security of the person.
The landmark decision in this area of the law is Singh, a case involving
the deportation of refugee claimants who feared political persecution in
their home countries. The claimants had been unsuccessful in
establishing status as "Convention refugees."7 3 Wilson J., who wrote for
three judges, found that the claimants' right to security of the person had
been violated and that the requirements of fundamental justice required
that the claimants have an oral hearing before they could be denied
refugee status. The significance of this decision is that "security of the
person" can be engaged by state-imposed psychological stress felt by
68 In Hurd v. Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 594 (C.A.), the court held
that deportation is not a form of punishment and therefore does not try a permanent resident more
than once for criminal conduct.
69 In Chiarell/4 supra note 66, the Supreme Court of Canada held that deportation is not
punishment and therefore does not violate s. 12 of the Charter.
70 Ibid. The Supreme Court of Canada held that differential treatment of criminals who are
citizens (and not deported) and those who are permanent residents (and subject to deportation)
does not violate s. 15 of the Charter.
71 See B. Jackman, "Advocacy, Immigration and the Charter" 9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 286 at 288-90.
72 See also Cohen, supra note 50 at 486-500.
73 The definition of a Convention refugee is taken from the Refugee Convention, supra note 3,
and is incorporated into s. 2(1) of the Immigration Act as follows:
"Convention refugee" means any person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion, (i) is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or by
reason of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or (ii)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of his former habitual residence
and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to return to that country.
Section 6(2) of the Immigration Act, however, allows for a broader meaning to be given to
"refugee" whereby asylum may be granted to displaced and persecuted persons who do not meet
the strict test under the Refugee Convention, supra note 3.
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aliens who, in this case, feared punishment abroad. The limitation of the
case is that it was based on the procedural content of the principles of
fundamental justice; it is clear that the aliens had no substantive rightper
se to seek asylum in Canada.
With regard to aliens with permanent resident status, the
decision of the Supreme Court in Chiarelli negatively answers the
question whether deportation violates section 7 of the Charter. The
permanent resident in Chiarelli had been convicted of possession of
narcotics for the purposes of trafficking and ordered deported under
section 32(2) of the Immigration Act. An appeal on equitable grounds
was not available. In considering section 7 of the Charter, Sopinka J.,
writing for the majority, held that is was not necessary to decide whether
deportation for serious offences can be conceptualized as a deprivation
of liberty. Further, with regard to the principles of fundamental justice,
Sopinka J. held:
[I]n determining the scope of principles of fundamental justice as they apply to this case,
the court must look to the principles and policies underlying immigration law. The most
fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified
right to enter or remain in the country. At common law an alien has no right to enter or
remain in the country.... One of the conditions Parliament has imposed on a permanent
resident's rights to remain in Canada is that he or she not be convicted of an offence for
which a term of imprisonment of five years or more may be imposed. This condition
represents a legitimate, non-arbitrary choice by Parliament of a situation in which it is not
in the public interest to allow a non-citizen to remain in the country.... There is nothing
inherently unjust about a mandatory [deportation] order. 74
Beyond the fact that a permanent resident has violated section
27(1)(d)(ii) of the Immigration Act, Sopinka J. held that there are no
"aggravating or mitigating circumstances"7S to consider when giving
effect to a deportation order. In a subsequent case, Nguyen v. Canada
(Employment and Immigration),76 also involving the deportation of a
permanent resident under section 32(2), Marceau J. of the Federal
Court of Appeal wrote in obiter:
While Sopinka J., in writing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chiarelli ... has not
considered it necessary to take a firm position on whether the issuance of a deportation
order would affect the liberty of the individual within the meaning of section 7 of the
Charter, it seems to me, with respect, that forcibly deporting an individual against his will
74 Chiarelli, supra note 66 at 733-34. See also Hoang v. Canada (Employment and
Immigration), (1990) 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 35 (F.C.A.), where it was held that deportation for serious
offences is not a deprivation of an alien's liberty under s. 7 of the Charter.
75 Chiarelli, supra note 66 at 734.
76 [1993] 1 F.C. 696 (C.A.) [hereinafter Nguyen].
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has the necessary effect of interfering with his liberty, in any meaning that the word can
bear.7 7
The court went on to hold that there was no violation of the principles of
fundamental justice and hence, no section 7 violation caused by the
deportation of the permanent resident. In both Nguyen and Chiarelli, an
appeal from the deportation order on compassionate grounds had been
precluded by the issuance of a security certificate.78
3. Section 7 of the Charter and international law
In light of the above analysis, two issues arise for domiciled
residents facing deportation from Canada: 1) whether their right to life,
liberty or security of the person is violated by the deportation order; and
2) whether the violation is in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice. In both of these respects, section 7 of the Charter
has potential to be significantly influenced by international human rights
law. Before discussing in detail how international law can be used to
support Charter challenges to deportation, one must establish a
frameowrk for analysis. This framework identifies how international law
can assist, first, in interpreting the scope of the right to "life, liberty and
security of the person" and, second, in giving meaning to the "principles
of fundamental justice."
a) Scope of section 7
With regard to the first part of the framework, international
human rights law has already been used to interpret the scope of section
7. In Singh, Wilson J. referred to article 25(1) of the Universal
77 1bid. at 703, note 5 [emphasis added].
78 See also supra note 60. Note that in Canepa v. Canada (Employment and Immigration),
[1992] 3 F.C. 270 (C.A.) [hereinafter Canepa] it was also held that in light of Chiarelli, deporting a
permanent resident for serious offences does not violate the principles of fundamental justice nor
can it be considered a deprivation of liberty. The court in Canepa refused to consider the personal
circumstances of the deportee under s. 7 of the Charter even though an appeal was available on
equitable grounds under s. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, supra note 41. However, under s. 12 of
the Charter the "personal merits and demerits" of the deportee were considered, but the
deportation order was upheld even though the deportee had been here for twenty years, had family
here, did not speak the language of the State of origin, and most of the offences in question were for
breaking and entering.
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Declaration in interpreting "security of the person" under the Charter.79
In holding that the deportation of refugees infringes the security of their
person, she also referred to Canada's "willingness to live up to the
obligations it has undertaken as a signatory to the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees."8 0
In R v. Jones,81 Wilson J., writing in dissent, broadly formulated
the right to liberty, to include parental freedom to choose how to
educate one's children, and in doing so referred to article 8(1) of the
ECHR and article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. 82
In B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,83 a
case also dealing with parental decision-making and freedom regarding
child-rearing, Lamer C.J. referred to article 9(1) of the iccPi, article 5(1)
of the ECHR, and article 3 of the Universal Declaration in formulating
"liberty" as freedom from physical restraint.8 4 In considering the
international conventional law, he wrote:
I am fully aware that the weight to be given to the foregoing may be uncertain, but
nevertheless I believe that it provides an additional indication, at least, of the scope that the
framers of the Charter may have intended to give to the expression "right to liberty" in the
context of s. 7.85
The relevance of these decisions in the context of deportation
challenges is the approval by the judiciary of using international human
rights law to support definitions of "liberty" and "security of the person."
79 Supra note 41 at 207.
80 Ibid. at 193.
81 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 [hereinafterJones].
82 Supra note 3, art. 8(1) protects a person's "right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondance." Article 2 protects the "right of parents to ensure such education
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions."
83 [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [hereinafter Children'sAid]. Wilson J.'s formulation of liberty in Jones,
supra note 81 was adopted by La Forest J., writing for three judges, in the Children's Aid case. La
Forest J. also held that parental liberty under s. 7 of the Charter does encompass the right to deny
one's children lifesaving medical treatment.
84 ICCPR, supra note 3, arts. 9(1) and 5(1) protect the "right to liberty and security of person" in
the context of arrest and detention; art. 3 protects the "right to life, liberty and security of person"
with no reference to specific context.
85 Children's Aid, supra note 83 at 350 [emphasis added]. Lamer C.J. also referred to art. 7 of
the American Convention ("right to personal liberty" in criminal context), arts. 1 and 25 of the
American Declaration ("right to life, liberty and security of his person" and criminal due process
rights). Lamer C.J. used these international agreements to support a definition of liberty that is
restricted to the "physical dimension of the word 'liberty' (supra note 83 at 348). Lamer C.J. held
that liberty under s. 7 of the Charter does not include the parental right to deny children life-saving
medical treatment for religious reasons.
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In particular, Singh is useful as it directly relates to the immigration
context, although it is limited in many ways to the special circumstances
faced by refugees at international law.86 It does, however, confirm a
definition of "security of the person" as freedom from state-imposed
psychological stress.8 7 Both Jones and Children's Aid are useful because
they recognize liberty interests under domestic and international law.
Whether liberty is construed broadly, to include "autonomy in making
decisions of fundamental personal importance"8 8 or narrowly, to include
freedom from physical restraint,8 9 the deportation of a domiciled
resident is likely an infringement thereof. On the one hand, the forcible
removal of a domiciled alien-having substantial family, social, and
community ties in Canada-has an obvious physical impact on the
deportee's mobility rights. On the other hand, just as Jones and
Children'sAid addressed the question of state interference with parental
liberty, deportation can also seriously interfere with a parent-alien's
autonomy and personal choice regarding his or her family life. However,
as discussed in Part IV, below, the impact may not be only on the
deportee but also on the deportee's children, whose rights are also
protected at international law. Further, where a domiciled alien is
deported without regard to "mitigating" or "personal" circumstances, it
may amount in practice to the deportation of the rest of the family,
including dependent children who may be citizens of Canada.
Moreover, state-ordered deportation engages "security of the person" by
imposing psychological stress on a domiciled alien who is forcibly
removed from family, children, and community.
86 The main protection available for refugees is the right of non-refoulement set out in the
Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33. It prohibits a State from returning a Convention refugee to
a country where the refugee's life or freedom is threatened by persecution. Many have argued that
this principle exists as a norm of customary international law but it is not applicable to aliens in
general. See on this topic, G. Stenberg, Non-Expulsion and Non-Refoulement (Uppsala, Sweden:
Iusrus Forlag, 1989) at 267-80.
87 See Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at 587-88 [hereinafter
Rodriguez] andR. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 173 [hereinafter Morgentaler].
88 Morgentaler, supra note 87 at 166, Wilson J. See also La Forest J.'s judgment in Children's
Aid, supra note 83 at 364-66, approving of Wilson J.'s broad formulation of liberty.
89 For judgments finding a narrow definition of liberty see: Children's Aid, supra note 83 at
347-48, Lamer C.J.; Morgentaler, supra note 87 at 51, Dickson C.J.; and Reference Re ss. 193 and
195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at 1177-78, Lamer J. [hereinafter Re
Criminal Code].
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b) Principles of Fundamental Justice
The second way in which international law can influence the
interpretation of section 7 was approved of by Lamer J., as he then was,
in Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 197990:
[S]s. 8 to 14 [of the Charter] provide an invaluable key to the meaning of "principles of
fundamental justice". Many have been developed over time as presumptions of the
common law, others have found expression in the international conventions on human rights.
All have been recognized as essential elements of a system for the administration of
justice which is founded upon a belief in "the dignity and worth of the human person"
(preamble to the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. III) and on "the rule of law"
(preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).91
The principles of fundamental justice are found in the "basic
tenets of our legal system"92 and acquire meaning in the context of a
given case. By considering international customary and conventional law
one can identify the principles of fundamental justice which are
inextricably linked to the inherent dignity of all persons. In fact, the
protection of human dignity is a principle of fundamental importance
which lies not only at the essence of a free and democratic society, but
also at the heart of the Charter itself. As such, the notion of human
dignity is vital to the interpretation of all Charter protections, including
section 7.93 Respect for human dignity also represents the genesis of
such international instruments as the UN Charter, the Universal
Declaration, and the ICCPR. 94 Once the principles of fundamental justice
have been identified, it is necessary to balance the interests of the state
with those of the individual. This "balancing of interests" must be
consistent with the aforementioned principles of fundamental justice.95
Thus, to determine whether the deportation of an alien violates the
principles of fundamental justice, it is necessary to balance the interests
90 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter Re B.C. Motor VehicleAct].
91 Ibid. at 503 [emphasis added].
92 Ibid.
93 The importance of human dignity to Charter interpretation is widely recognized:
Morgentaler, supra note 87 at 166, Wilson J.; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 346,
Dickson C.J.; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136, Dickson C.J. [hereinafter Oakes]; and Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act, supra note 90 at 512.
94 See the Preambles of these instruments, supra note 3.
95 See Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 at 539; P. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3
S.C.R. 154 at 226, regarding the balancing of competing interests; and Rodriguez, supra note 87 at
593-94.
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of the deportee with those of the expelling State. Finally, in Part IV,
below, the argument is made that contra Chiarelli, deportation of a
domiciled alien, such as a permanent resident, can violate the principles
of fundamental justice, especially where the decision to deport has an
impact on children and family life.
4. Section 1 of the Charter and international law
Should a court find that deportation is a violation of liberty or
security of the person contrary to the principles of fundamental justice,
there is the possibility that the deportation could be justified under
section one of the Charter96:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
However, in considering what constitutes a "reasonable limit" justified in
other free and democratic societies, the principles and standards set out
in the ICCPR, ECHR, Universal Declaration, American Declaration, and
American Convention are particularly insightful. 97 Articles 8 to 11 of the
ECHR, for example, guarantee certain freedoms but allow limitations
"prescribed by law" and "necessary in a democratic society." The
similarity in wording between the Charter and the ECHR is striking in this
respect. Further, the interpretation of section 1, in accordance with the
test set out in Oakes,98 is particularly influenced by international law
when the courts consider the following question: are there pressing and
substantial government objectives which justify imposing restrictions on
Charter rights and freedoms? In the analysis that follows the argument is
96 Since both ss. 1 and 7 of the Charter involve a balancing of state interests with individual
interests, authority is divided as to whether a breach of s. 7 (fundamental justice) can ever be
justified by s. 1 (Oakes test). That a s. 7 breach cannot be so justified is supported by Re Criminal
Code, supra note 89 at 1223, Wilson J.; R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 at 1034, Wilson J.; and
Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 at 151-52, McLachlin J. However, that a s. 7 violation
can be justified, where an independent principle of fundamental justice is violated, is supported by
R v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 at 789-90, Cory J.
9 7 Schabas, supra note 39 at 37-38.
98 Supra note 93 at 138-39. In order to be justified under s. 1, a limitation on a Charter right or
freedom must meet the following requirements: 1) the limitation must have a sufficiently important
objective which justifies the infringement; 2) the measures used must be rationally connected to the
objective sought; 3) the measures used must impair the right or freedom as little as possible; and 4)
there must be proportionality between the effects of the restrictive measures and the objective being
sought.
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made that, in light of these international conventions, the deportation of
domiciled aliens does not meet such pressing objectives and cannot be
characterized as a reasonable limit.
IV. DEPORTATION AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. General Principles
Part III of this article illustrates how Canadian law distinguishes
between aliens and citizens with regard to their mobility rights. This
distinction, however, does not give rise to any number of ways in which
aliens may be differentiated from citizens of the country in which they
live. Rather, international human rights law set out in the Universal
Declaration and the ICCPR and reflected in national legislation such as
the Charter, apply equally to aliens and nationals. Fundamental human
rights which exist at customary international law "have the effect of
restricting the exercise of sovereignty by the territorial state."99 Thus,
while the deportation of aliens by States is recognized at international
law, the power to expel aliens is not completely discretionary, neither in
form nor in substance. The power at international law to expel or deport
aliens can be summarized as follows:
The right of states to expel aliens is generally recognised.... On the other hand, while a
state has a broad discretion in exercising its right to expel aliens, its discretion is not
absolute. Thus, by customary international law it must not abuse its rights by acting
arbitrarily in taking its decision to expel an alien, and it must act reasonably in the
99 Kindred et aL, supra note 8 at 542.
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manner in which it effects an expulsion. 100
Goodwin-Gill writes that the State's power "must be exercised in good
faith and not for some ulterior motii'e, such as genocide, confiscation of
property, or the surrender of an individual to persecution."101 The
justification for deportation consists in protecting the interests of the
State from the continued presence of the alien.102 Under Canadian
domestic law, the justification offered for the deportation of permanent
residents is derived: 1) from the common law principle that aliens have
no right to remain in Canada;,and 2) from the provisions of the
Immigration Act. Canadian law therefore incorporates international
custom and does not deport permanent residents, or other domiciled
aliens, arbitrarily. Moreover, the requirement at customary
international law that deportation be justified also necessitates a
balancing of interests, on the part of both the deporting State and the
alien. Goodwin-Gill writes:
The principle of good faith and the requirement of justification, or 'reasonable cause',
demand that due consideration be given to the interests of the individual, including his
basic human rights, his family, property, and other connections with the State of residence,
and his legitimate expectations. These must be weighed against the competing claims of
'ordre public.'103
100 Oppenheim,supra note 4 at 940 [footnotes ommitted]. This article is concerned with the
substantive aspects of the deportation power (Le., why and in what circumstances an alien is
deported) and not the procedural aspects of how a person is deported (i.e., due process and
adequate appeal provisions in domestic immigration law). But for a thorough discussion on the
manner and form of expulsion see Goodwin-Gill, supra note 51 at 262-81.
See as well, "General Comment 15(27)" (The Position of Aliens under the Covenant), adopted
by the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR, at its 696th meeting on 22 July 1986. In that
Comment, the Committee made the following observations, at para. 10: "Article 13 [of the iccv]
directly regulates only the procedure and not the substantive grounds for expulsion. However, by
allowing only those carried out 'in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law,' its
purpose is clearly to prevent arbitrary expulsion."
As well, the Committee wrote, at para. 5:
The Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a
State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its
territory. However, in certain instances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant
even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-
discrimination, prohibition or inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise [emphsasis
added].
101 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 51 at 228.
102 IbM. at 229-62.
103 Ibid at 262 [emphasis added].
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This balancing of individual and state interests is precisely the sort of
consideration which is called for under section 7 of the Charter.
However, as indicated in Chiarelli, aside from the fact that an alien has
breached s. 27(1) of the Immigration Act, there are no "mitigating or
aggravating circumstances" considered by the courts. The Chiarelli
position sanctions the fundamental importance of the State's power to
expel while seemingly ignoring the alien's competing interests. In order
to extend constitutional protections to permanent residents facing
deportation from Canada, it is incumbent upon the courts to adequately
consider the interests of the individual, whose ties with the State are
through home, family, and society. This can be accomplished if the
courts are persuaded, insofar as aliens are concerned, of the following:
"[L]e d6sir de l'6tranger de vivre en compagnie de sa famille n'est que
l'expression l6gitime d'un droit 616mentaire de la personne: celui de
mener une vie familiale normale."104
B. United States Practice
Instruction regarding the extension of constitutional protections
to aliens can be taken from United States jurisprudence which serves as
an important and persuasive source of law for Canadian courts. In fact,
the influence of "American constitutionalism"105 on international
human rights law has been referred to as the "Overseas Trade in the
American Bill of Rights."106 Indeed, Canadian courts are joined by
courts in Europe and around the world in their frequent references to
United States Supreme Court precedents.10 7 As Professor Henkin
explains:
Americans were prominent among the architects and builders of international human
rights, and American constitutionalism was a principal inspiration and model for them.
As a result, most of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are in their essence American constitutional rights
projected around the world.108
104 H. Labayle, <<Le droit de l'tranger mener une vie familiale normale* (1993) 9(3) Rev. fr.
Droit adm. 511 at 511.
105 L Henkin, "Rights: American and Human" (1979) 79 Colum. L. Rev. 405 at 407.
106 A. Lester, "The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights" (1988) 88 Colum. L. Rev.
537.
107 Lillich, supra note 27 at 55-59.
108 Henkin, supra note 105 at 415. See also Lillich, supra note 27 at 56.
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In the area of immigration law, where constitutional protections are
sought by aliens, American jurisprudence is of particular significance
given that:
Before the courts of the United States it has been argued that the resident alien, of all
people, will frequently have established strong family ties and acquired property interests,
and that these and other relevant considerations together amount to a 'vested right of
residence' worthy of greater protection than is provided by mere procedural
guarantees.109
The "reluctance to use the right of expulsion in relation to
domiciled aliens"110 is more apparent in American courts than in
Canadian courts, since the latter persistently refuse to characterize
deportation as true punishment or deprivation of liberty.1)) Early
evidence of the American reluctance can be found in Hand J.'s
recommendation against the deportation of a convicted alien in U.S. ex
rel. ionis v. Davis (Labor) :112
At any rate we think it not improper to say that deportation under the circumstances
would be deplorable. Whether the relator came here in arms or at the age often, he is as
much our product as though his mother had borne him on American soil. He knows no
other language, no other people, no other habits, than ours; he will be as much a stranger
in Poland as any one born of ancestors who immigrated in the seventeeth century.
However heinous his crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned
by the common consent of all civilized peoples. ... That our reasonable efforts to rid
ourselves of unassimilable immigrants should in execution be attended by such a cruel
and barbarous result would be a national reproach.113
In Harisiades v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization,114
which upheld the deportation of a domiciled alien for membership in the
Communist Party, Douglas J., of the United States Supreme Court,
wrote in dissent:
An alien, who is assimilated in our society, is treated as a citizen so far as his property and his
liberty are concemed. He can live and workhere and raise a family, secure in the personal
guarantees every resident has and safe from discriminations that might be leveled against
him because he was born abroad. Those guarantees of liberty and livelihood are the
essence of the freedom which this country from the beginning has offered the people of
109 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 51 at 259 [emphasis added].
110 Oppenheim, supra note 4 at 943, note 13.
111 See Part III of this article.
112 13 F.2d 630 at 630-31 (2d Cir. 1926).
113 Ibid. at 630-31 [emphasis added]. The recommendation against deportation was entered
too late in this case and thus not effective in barring the deportation.
114 342 U.S. 580 (1951).
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all lands. If those rights, great as they are, have constitutional protection, I think the more
important one--the right to remain here-has a like dignity.
115
Both of these judicial opinions go a long way towards recognizing that at
some point an alien is said to have "assimilated" with the State in which
he or she resides. Once assimilation is established, deportation must be
equated with "banishment," to use a term which appears frequently in
Douglas J.'s dissent. A more recent decision supporting this general
theory of "assimilation" (a theory which commentators refer to as the
"participation model" of aliens' rights 16) is Plyler v. Doe.117 In that case
a Texas statute,118 which denied public education to children who were
not legally admitted into the United States, was found to violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 19 The United
States Supreme Court found that the denial of public education to
undocumented alien children did not further a substantial goal of the
State, but victimized "innocent children." 120 Although the parents of the
children could be held accountable for their illegal entry into the United
States, the children "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their
own status." 121 Because of the fundamental importance of having an
educated populace, the court held that, overall, the societal costs would
be significant if the class of aliens in question were denied an
education. 122 The court recognized the future role these aliens had as
participants in American society and found in favour of allowing them to
contribute to the "progress of the Nation."123 The court concluded in a
similar vein:
115 Ibid. at 599 [emphasis added].
116 "Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens" (1983) 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 1286 at 1303-08.
117 457 U.S. 202 (1983) [hereinafter Plyler].
1 1 8 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
119 U.S. Const. amend. XIV provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Due process protections for aliens in the United States, even aliens in
the country illegally, have been recognized for a long time. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
120 Plyler, supra note 117 at 224.
121 Ibid. at 220, citing Timble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 at 770 (1977). Section 33(1) of the
Immigration Act, supra note 41, is incompatible with this view, as it provides for the expulsion of
dependent alien children where a deportation order has been made against the alien-parent.
122 Ibid. at 221.
123 Ibid. at 220.
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In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this
classification will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful
residents or citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand precisely what the
State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of
illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of
unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be
achieved by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of
the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation. 24
If read broadly, Plyler can be used in deportation cases where an
alien-parent's conduct or status creates hardship for dependent family
members. As Peter Schuck asks: "[c]an the Court's 'innocent children'
rationale [in Plyler] be harmonized with its willingness to allow the
routine deportation of children who are not only innocent of their
parents' wrongdoing but are United States citizens?" 25 In the Canadian
context, the decision can be used to "mark a fundamental break with
classical immigration law's concept of national community" 26 and to
broaden the scope of State "power to decide who is entitled to the
benefits of membership." 27 This means recognizing that all domiciled
aliens have a stake in the national community, even if convicted of
crimes, as the claimants in Chiarelli, Nguyen, and Canepa were. When
convicted of criminal offences, domiciled aliens must serve their
sentences as all other convicted criminals do, but not be subject to
banishment where it is shown that for all practical purposes the alien has
"assimilated" into Canadian society. Moreover, where the effects of
deportation are likely to have an impact on dependents and, in
particular, "innocent children," the argument against deportation is
compelling. In such cases, the principles of fundamental justice,
informed by the theory of "assimilation" will require, in most
circumstances, that the alien be permitted to remain in Canada.
C. Australian State Practice
Australian practice in the area of deportation has also given rise
to jurisprudence which emphasizes the "absorption" of aliens into the
Australian community as the test for limiting the expulsion power of the
124 Ibid. at 230.
125 "The Transformation of Immigration Law" (1984) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1 at 55. See also
supra note 121.
126 Ibid. at 54.
1271bid.
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State. David Wood comments on the nature of the Australian power to
deport:
As a constitutional issue, debate in Australia has centered on the question of how the
Commonwealth's immigration power is to be interpreted. Two views of the power have
found favour in the High Court. According to the wide view, irrespective of how long an
immigrant has permanently resided in Australia, he never gets beyond the reach of the
power. In the words of the well-known aphorism of Isaacs J (as he then was), "Once an
immigrant; always an immigrant". By contrast, according to the narrow view of the
immigration power, at some point an immigrant becomes "absorbed" into the Australian
community and passes beyond its scope. 128
Although Canadian courts most often refer to American jurisprudence
in interpreting constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court of Canada
also considers relevant the jurisprudence of other Commonwealth
countries having the same British legal traditions as our own.129 Thus,
the significance of the Australian "absorption" theory should not be
overlooked when advancing Charter arguments against deportation.
The absorption theory was adopted in Kuswardana v. Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,130 where the Federal Court considered
the position of the High Court of Australia regarding the scope of the
legislative immigration power. The court in Kuswardana held that "the
legislative power does not extend to the exclusion or deportation of a
person who has become established as a member of the Australian
community."131 This proposition is based on the principle, endorsed by
some courts, that an immigrant (and potential deportee) ceases to be an
immigrant once the person becomes a member of the Australian
community.132 Those who have become members of the Australian
community have been referred to by the High Court of Australia as
including: "persons who had made their home in Australia and become
part of its people;"1 33 "a person whose permanent home is in Australia
128 "Deportation, The Immigration Power, and Absorption into the Australian Community"
(1986) 16 Fed. L. Rev. 288 at 288-89 [footnotes omitted].
129 See for example Carey v. Ontario, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 637 [hereinafter Carey] where the
Supreme Court of Canada surveyed the law in England, Australia, Scotland, New Zealand, and the
United States. La Forest, supra note 2 at 239 comments that in, Carey, the "analysis of the foreign
materials played an essential, and not merely a supporting, role in the Court's decision."
130 (1981), 35 A.L.R. 186 [hereinafter Kuswardana]. See contra, Pochi v. Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1982), 43 A.L.R. 261 where the High Court of Australia refused to
adopt the "absorption" theory.
131 Supra note 130 at 202.
132 Exparte Walsh and Johnson; and in re Yates (1925), 37 C.LR. 36 at 110 (Aust. H.C.).
133 Ibid. at 62, Knox C.J.
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and who is therefore a member of the Australian community;"134 "those
who belong to the Australian community;"135 and "a full member of the
Australian community."1 36
In order to gain recognition as a member of Australian society a
number of factors are considered. Generally, a five-year period is set by
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in Australia as the
minimum amount of time during which absorption can occur.13 7
Further, family connectionsI38 and economic ties 39 with the jurisdiction
are very important to establishing community membership. Moreover,
the presence or absence of criminal activity is not determinative in and
of itself. Rather, the seriousness of and/or circumstances surrounding
the criminal offences are weighed against the backdrop of family,
employment, and community relations.' 40
134 Ibid. at 63.
135 Koon Wing Lau v. Calwell (1949), 80 C.L.R. 533 at 577, Dixon J.
136 v. Director-General of Social Welfare for Victoria; and Ex parte Henry (1975), 133 C.L.R.
369 at 373, Gibbs J.
137 Wood, supra note 128 at 294.
138 See Re Barbaro and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1982) 71 F.L.R. 198
where the Australian Federal Court considered the hardship that would be endured by the family
(in this case a wife and five children) of the deportee as the most important factor against
deportation.
139 See Wood, supra note 128 at 296, notes 21 and 22.
140 See Re Kurtovic and Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989),
86 A.L.R. 99 (Aust. Fed. Ct.) where the alien-deportee had been convicted of manslaughter, was
ordered deported, and then had his deportation order revoked in 1985. It was a condition of the
revocation that he not commit a further offence. In 1988, a new deportation order was issued even
though the alien had not been convicted of any further offence. Einfeld J. considered a number of
factors which weighed against the new deportation order. Specifically, Einfeld J. wrote, at 111-12:
The psychiatric and other expert evidence tendered overwhelmingly supports the
conclusion that the applicant's crime was one of emotion and passion; that he has learned
the significance of its horror; that he is remorseful for what he did; that the rest of his
former family are not in danger; that other recidivism is unlikely; and that he wants to
make a good and lawful Australian resident or citizen. It seems to me reasonable to
assume that some or all of these very important developments were caused or
contributed to by the revocation of the deportation order and the maintenance of that
revocation after the extraordinary intervention of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Although these matters are not "detrimental" in the usual sense, I think that they are
relevant to and should be considered in this context, as well as in the assessment of the
extent of unfairness of the deportation order in issue here.
The fact of employment is also an important element to consider in the process of aliens
becoming "absorbed" into society. For example, as set out in the Convention on Migrant Workers
and Their Families, supra note 3, art. 2, special rights apply to a "person who is to be engaged, is
engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national." The Convention, art. 22, addresses a comprehensive set of rights, including the right
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The absorption theory is useful in characterizing the liberty
interests of an individual deportee and balancing them against the
interests of the State, under sections 1 and 7 of the Charter. Thus,
whenever an alien, who has become a full member of Canadian society,
is subject to deportation, consideration must be given to the interference
with the individual's family and community life. Such consideration
should be constitutionally protected, regardless of the absence or
presence of statutory appeals under the Immigration Act.
V. DEPORTATION AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
A. General Principles
By looking to international conventional law, a strong argument
is made that, contra Chiarelli, personal and mitigating circumstances
should always be considered in the deportation context. Instruction can
be taken from the decision of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in
Rankin v. Iran,141 where it was held that:
According to the practice of States, the writings of scholars, the decisions of international
tribunals, and bilateral treaty provisions ... international law imposes certain restraints on
the circumstances and the manner in which a State may expel aliens from its territory. A
claimant alleging expulsion has the burden of proving the wrongfulness of the expelling
State's action, in other words that it was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in breach of the expelling
State's treaty obligations.1 4 2
This decision is significant insofar as it recognizes that the expulsion of
aliens can violate international customary and conventional law. With
regard to the latter, restrictions on the right to expel an alien can be
express. Article 13 of the ICCPR provides that an alien "lawfully in the
territory" can be expelled "only in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with law." Article 22(9) of the American Convention
prohibits the "collective expulsion of aliens."143 Also, to expel aliens
against arbitrary and collective expulsion. Assuming the Convention is ratified by Canada and
eventually comes into force, domiciled aliens may rely on their status as migrant workers, and argue
that they, and the members of their families, should not be expelled.
141 (1987), 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 135. The Tribunal was set up to address claims of wrongful
expulsion of American nationals arising as a result of the Islamic Revolution.
142 Ibid. at 142 [emphasis added].
143 Although Canada is not a Party to the American Convention, supra note 3, it is a member
of the Organization of American States (OAS). This means that individuals can complain of
violations of the American Declaration, supra note 3, by OAS members to the Inter-American
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who are identified as a single ethnic or racial group would contravene
article 4 of the ICERD, which prohibits State authorities from promoting
or inciting "racial discrimination."
The expulsion of aliens may also undermine treaty provisions
which apply to "everyone." In particular, where domiciled aliens are
deported, the impact on family members, especially children, is an
important concern. Once an alien has been "absorbed" by the
community and established family relations, deportation can seriously
interfere with the protection of other family members' rights. Further,
deportation in such circumstances, violates the liberty of the deportee to
make a choice of fundamental personal importance-to raise a family-
while restricting his or her physical mobility. The severance of close
family relations and banishment to a strange, foreign State will also
violate the psychological integrity of the deportee. In light of these
concerns, it is relevant to consider exactly what are Canada's
international obligations to the Family and the Child.
B. International Instruments and Canada's Obligations
to Protect the Family
1. Resolutions
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration begins: "Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world."144 Article 16(3) of the Universal
Declaration provides that the family is the "natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State."145 Article 25(1) provides for the right to "health and well-being
of the family" and article 25(2) provides that childhood is entitled to
"special care and assistance." Article VII of the American Declaration
provides that "all children have the right to special protection, care and
aid."
Principle 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child provides that
all the rights set forth in the Declaration are to be enjoyed "without any
exception whatsoever." Principle 6 of the Declaration provides that a
Commission of the oAs, which publishes reports of such complaints. See Kindred et aL, supra note 8
at 613.
144 Supra note 3 [emphasis added].
145 INL [emphasis added].
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child "shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the
responsibility of his parents, and, in any case, in an atmosphere of
affection and of moral and material security." Principle 8 provides that
"[t]he child shall in all circumstances be among the first to receive
protection and relief."
2. Conventions
Article 23(1) of the ICCPR repeats exactly article 16(3) of the Universal
Declaration. Article 24 of the ICCPR provides that every child has the
right, without discrimination, to "measures of protection" on the part of
family, society, and the State. Article 10(1) of the ICECSR provides that
"[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to
the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society."
Article 10(3) of the ICECSR provides for "special measures of protection
and assistance" for children and young persons "without any
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions." 146 Article
12(2)(a) provides that steps be taken by State parties to provide "for the
healthy development of the child."
The Preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes
the family as the "fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all of its members."
Article 8 protects the child's right to preserve family relations. Article 9
stipulates that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents
except where "such separation is necessary for the best interests of the
child." Article 16 provides that "[n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home." Article
22 provides that States Parties obtain information necessary for the
reunification of refugee children with their families.
C. Regional Instruments and Obligations of Other States
to Protect the Family
Article 19 of the American Convention essentially repeats what article
24 of the ICCPR states. Article 18 of the African Charter states that the
"family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be
146 Section 33(1) of the Immigration Act, supra note 41, appears to violate this provision
because alien children can be deported due to their parents' status as aliens. Children whose
parents are nationals cannot be deported.
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protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and
morals." Article 44(1) of the Convention on Migrant Workers and Their
Families repeats the text of Article 23(1) of the ICCPR "recognizing that
the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State." Finally, article 8(1) of
the ECHR, which has generated important case law in the area of
deportation, stipulates: "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence."
D. National Application of Instruments
This survey of international instruments reveals how fundamental the
protection of the family is to human rights law. Presuming that Canada's
legislators do not intend to violate Canada's obligations at international
law, it is important that domestic law also protect children and families.
Indeed, section 7 of the Charter requires that the principles of
fundamental justice be respected. Since these principles are rooted in
the dignity and worth of all human beings and the values and principles
essential to free and democratic societies, the integrity of the family unit
is arguably one such principle.
To support this proposition the ICCPR, ICECSR, and Convention on the
Rights of the Child, even if they remain unimplemented in a technical
sense, still represent Canada's obligations at international law. Charter
protection is meant to be at least as great as these international
protections. Further the use of the ECHR, American Convention, African
Charter, and Convention on Migrant Workers and Their Families to which
Canada is not a Party can still be used to interpret domestic law in this
area.
In particular, the ECHR and the related jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, can be used to interpret Canada's obligations to
the Family and Child. Although the ECHR is usually considered
non-binding, conventional international law for Canadian purposes, the
argument has been made that the ECHR has attained the status of
customary international law.147 This is supported by the fact that the
ECHR has been "incorporated into the great majority of newly
independent Commonwealth countries."148 Anthony Lester, who refers
14 7 Duffy, supra note 33 at 599-605.
148 Lillich, supra note 27 at 59.
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to the European Court of Human Rights149 as "the strongest
international court of human rights,"150 observes:
There are some twenty-six Commonwealth countries whose independence constitutions
guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms modelled on the European Convention ... In this
way, the Parliament of Westminster has exported the rights and freedoms of the Convention to
the common-law countries of the new Commonwealth on a scale without parallel in the rest of
the world. 51
To consider the ECHR and related jurisprudence as international custom
would mean, under an adoption theory, that norms established by the
ECHR are automatically part of Canadian law. Nonetheless, the position
adopted by the courts is that the ECHR is a useful, yet non-binding tool of
interpretation.
1. European Convention on Human Rights and protection of the family
Article 8 of the ECHR and article 23 of the ICCPR contain similar
language which recognizes the importance of the family in the fabric of
society. However, article 8(2) of the ECHR goes on to state:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right [to respect for
private and family life] except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
In the absence of Canadian decisions on article 23 of the ICCPR, the
decisions of the European Court on article 8 of the ECHR are persuasive.
In a landmark decision, Berrehab v. The Netherlands,152 the European
Court found a breach of article 8 flowing from the deportation of a
domiciled alien. Mr. Berrehab, a Moroccan citizen, resided in
Amsterdam and had married a Dutch national. They had one child but
eventually divorced. After the divorce Mr. Berrehab was denied a
renewal of his residence permit and ordered deported. Mr. Berrehab
and his ex-wife complained to the European Commission of Human
Rights of a violation of article 8. In finding in favour of Mr. Berrehab,
the European Court considered that "the legitimate aim pursued [by the
State] has to be weighed against the seriousness of the interference with
149 [hereinafter European Court].
150 Lester, supra note 106 at 560.
151 Ibid. at 541.
152 (1988), 11 E.H.R.R. 321.
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the applicants' right to respect for their family life."153 The court held
that the Dutch government's aim in preserving the country's economic
well-being was outweighed by the extent of interference with Mr.
Berrehab's family. In addition to the "close ties" between the child and
Mr. Berrehab, the court noted that the alien had a home and held
employment in the State. Finally the court held that "a proper balance
was not achieved between the interests involved and there was therefore
a disproportion between the means employed and the legitimate aim
pursued."15 4
In Moustaquim v. Belgium,155 the alien, a Moroccan national, had
been issued a residence permit in Belgium where his parents and seven
siblings also resided. During the nineteen years Mr. Moustaquim spent
in Belgium, he developed a lengthy criminal record both as a minor and
an adult. He was eventually sentenced to two years in prison for some
twenty-two charges including theft, assault, and aggravated theft. A
deportation order was issued after part of the prison sentences had been
served. Mr. Moustaquim sought to have the deportation order revoked.
The court, in considering the State's submissions on the alleged danger
Mr. Moustaquim posed to the Belgian community, held: "The Court did
not in any way underestimate the Contracting States' concern to
maintain public order, in particular in exercising their right, as a matter
of well-established international law and subject to their treaty
obligations, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens."15 6
Having said that, the court indicated that the government's aim had to
be "necessary in a democratic society." This requirement was not met
because the interference with the alien's family life outweighed the
State's interests. In particular the court pointed out that
at the time the deportation order was made, all the applicant's close relatives [his parents and
his brothers and sisters] had been living in ... [Liege for a long while] ... Mr. Moustaquim himself
... [was less than two years old] when he arrived in Belgium. He had spent about twenty years
there with his family or not far away from them ... and had received all his schooling in French.
His familylife had thus been seriously disrupted by the deportation measure.15 7
153 Ibi at 331, para. 29.
154Ibid. Note the striking similarity in the language used by the court under art. 8(2) and the
language employed by Canadian courts under s. 1 of the Charter (see supra note 98).
155 (1991), Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 193 [hereinafterMoustaquim].
156 Ibid. at 14.
15 71b1d.
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In Beldjoudi v. France, 158 an Algerian citizen was ordered deported
after being convicted of numerous serious offences, including assault,
battery, theft, aggravated theft, and criminal damage. His sentences
amounted to over ten years of imprisonment. He had married a French
national, did not have any children, and although born and raised in
France, he had lost his French nationality.15 9 His parents and four
siblings also lived in France. Mr. Beldjoudi and his spouse claimed that
the deportation violated their right to family life and the court found in
their favour. In holding that the deportation was not proportionate to
the government's aim in protecting the ordre public, the court
considered: a) the fact that the alien had spent all his life in France (over
forty years); b) the admittedly serious nature of the alien's criminal
activity; c) the marriage to a French national; d) the lack of knowledge
of the language spoken in Algeria; and e) the lack of any ties, outside of
nationality, with Algeria.1 60
In a separate opinion, De Meyer J. wrote that, in spite of Mr.
Beldjoudi's long record of relatively serious offences, "he can be
sufficiently punished for these by the criminal law." In a concurring
opinion, Martens J. based his reasons on the interference with Mr.
Beldjoudi's private life under article 8(1). His judgment is based on a
theory of "integration with the community," which is very similar to the
absorption theory found in Australian law. Martens J. wrote:
In a Europe where a second generation of immigrants is already raising children ... it is high
time to ask ourselves whether this ban [on the expulsion of nationals] should not apply equally
to aliens who were born and bred in a member State or who have otherwise, by virtue of long
residence, become fully integrated there (and conversely, become completely segregated from
their country of origin) ... I believe that an increasing number of member States of the Council.
of Europe accept the principle that such "integrated aliens" should be no more liable to
expulsion than nationals.161
Of course, as the Australian experience has shown in Part IV, above,
evidence of family ties will go a long way towards establishing that a
person has become integrated with the community in question. The
analysis in Berrehab, Moustaquim, and Beldjoudi is essentially based on a
two-step process: first, a violation of the right to family life is found and
second, the breach is not justified because the interference with the
158 (1992), Eur. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 234-A [hereinafter Beldjoudi].
159 Ibid. at 9, para. 9. Mr. Beldjoudi and his Algerian born parents were deemed to have lost
French nationality when, after Algeria became independent on 3 July 1962, they had not made a
declaration recognizing French nationality before 27 March 1967.
160 Ibid. at 27-28.
1611bid. at 37 [footnotes omitted].
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individual's rights outweighs, or is disproportionate to, the State's
interests in protecting the ordrepublic.)62 Under section 7 of the Charter
a similar two step process is involved: first, a deportee must establish a
violation of liberty or security of the person; and second, the person
must show that the principles of fundamental justice, informed by article
23 of the ICCPR and related international obligations, do not favour the
State's interests. If the analysis then proceeds to section 1, the same
balancing of State and individual interests take place as under article
8(2) of the ECHR. And as the European experience suggests, the State is
hard pressed to justify a serious interference with an alien's family and
private life.
2. Relationship between article 23 of the ICCPR and article 8 of the ECHR
The Australian Human Rights Commission has had occasion to
comment on the interpretation of article 23 of the ICCPR, to which
Australia is also a State Party. In a report entitled "Deportation and the
Family"1 63 the Commission made a recommendation against a
deportation order issued by the Australian government. The deportee,
Mr. Booker, was convicted of various criminal offences for which his
prison sentences totalled three years. He was the biological father of
one child who lived with his former common law wife. He lived with
another woman, Mrs. Roth, who had children from another marriage. It
was on the basis of this latter relationship that Mr. Booker, Mrs. Roth,
and the children claimed that the deportation order violated article 23 of
the ICCPR. In finding a violation of the ICCPR the Commission wrote:
If anything, the scope of Article 23 of the ICCPR isgreater than that of Article 8 of the European
Convention, and there can be no basis for holding that a narrower interpretation of the concept
of the family than is the case in Europe. Accordingly,... Mr. Booker and Mrs. Roth and her
children are a family entitled to the protection of Article 23 of the ICCPR.164
162 In Lamguindaz v. UK (1993), 17 E.H.R.R. 213 the court also found a breach of art. 8 of
the ECHR. The case involved the deportation of a Moroccan citizen with a long criminal record.
Although a friendly settlement was reached between the parties, the court did find a violation of art.
8. In particular, the court wrote of the deportee, at 217: "Although he is legally an alien, his family
and social ties are therefore in the United Kingdom and his nationality status does not reflect his
actual position in human terms" [emphasis added].
163 Australian Human Rights Commission, "Deportation and the Family: A report on the
complaints of Mrs. M. Roth and Mr. C.J. Booker" (Report No. 8) (Canberra: C.J. Thompson,
September 1984).
164 Ibid. at 7 [emphasis added].
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This broad interpretation of the scope of Article 23 is also consistent
with the views of the Human Rights Committee established under the
ICCPR. 165 In its "General Comment 19(39)" (article 23),166 the Human
Rights Committee wrote:
Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes that the family
is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and
the State.... The Committee notes that the concept of the family may differ in some respects
from State to State, and even from region to region within a State, and that it is therefore not
possible to give the concept a standard definition. However, the Committee emphasizes that,
when a group of persons is regarded as a family under the legislation and practice of a State, it
must be given the protection referred to in Article 23.167
In addition to article 23 of the ICCPR, the Australian Human Rights
Commission considered Principles I and 6 of the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child. The Commission found that Mr. Booker's
deportation order violated both of these Principles:
The evidence ... indicates that Mrs. Roth's children now see Mr. Booker in the role of father. If
he is deported they will be discriminated against by losing that support and guidance which a
father can offer.... Mr. Booker is now in the position of a parent to these children and is anxious
for them to grow up in his care and under his responsibility. ... If he is deported, their rights to
his care and guidance will be destroyed. 168
Clearly, the Commission's principal concern was for the international
rights of the family and child in a situation where a domiciled alien was
facing deportation.
165 Article 28 of the ICCPR establishes a Human Rights Committee composed of nationals of
the States Parties. Under art. 40(1), States Parties are required to submit reports to the Committee
on the measures they have adopted to recognize the rights in the ICCPR. Article 40(4) provides that
the Human Rights Committee shall study reports submitted by the States Parties and transmit "such
general comments as it may consider appropriate." Since its inception, the Committee has adopted
a number of "General Comments" on the protection of families, children, and aliens under the
icCPR: see supra note 100 and infra note 168.
166 Adopted at the Human Rights Committee's 102d meeting on 24 July 1990.
167 Ibid., paras. 2-3. As indicated above, supra note 140, the Convention on Migrant Workers
and Their Families, reiterates the principle contained in art. 23 of the ICCPR.
168 Ibid. at 11-12, paras. 31-32. See also "General Comment 17(35)" (article 24), adopted by
the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR, at its 891st meeting on 5 April 1989. The following
observations were made on the protection of alien children, at para. 5:
The Covenant requires that children should be protected against discrimination on any
grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth.... Reports by State parties should indicate how legislation and practice ensure that
measures of protection are aimed at removing all discrimination in every field, including
inheritance, particularly as between children who are nationals and children who are
aliens or as between legitimate children and children born out of wedlock.
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By using the jurisprudence of the European Court in conjunction with
the interpretations of the Australian Human Rights Commission,169 and
the comments of the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR, the
case for constitutional protection of domiciled aliens ordered deported
from Canada is persuasive.
3. Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Canada
The case for constitutional protection of domiciled aliens is further
supported by the observations of the Committee which oversees the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. On 9 June 1995, the Committee
on the Rights of the Child adopted a number of critical observations
regarding Canada's deportation practices and their impact on the
Convention rights of children.170 One of the Committee's principal
subjects of concern was that the best interests of the Child were not
sufficiently protected in the immigration and deportation context.
Specifically, the Committee made the following observations:
The Committee recognizes the efforts made by Canada for many years in accepting a large
number of refugees and immigrants. Nevertheless, the Committee regrets that the principles of
non-discrimination, of the best interests of the child and of the respect for the views of the child
have not always been given adequate weight by administrative bodies dealing with the situation
of refugees or immigrant children. It is particularly worried by the resort of immigration
officials to measures of deprivation of liberty of children for security or other related purposes
and by the insufficient measures aimed at family reunification with a view to ensuring that it is
dealt with in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. The Committee specifically regrets the
delays in dealing with reunification of the family in cases where one or more members of the family
have been considered eligible for refugee status in Canada as in cases where refugee or immigrant
children born in Canada may be separated from theirparentsfacing a deportation order.171
As well, the Committee made a number of suggestions and
recommendations on the protection of children in the deportation
169 For another report of the Australian Human Rights Commission finding a breach of art.
23 of the ICCPR and the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, supra note 3, (where domiciled aliens
are deported) see: The Human Rights of Australian-Born Children: A report on the complaints of
Mr. and Mrs. Yilmaz (Report No.15) (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service,
August 1985).
170 Under art. 44 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 3, States Parties are
required to submit reports on the measures they have adopted in recognition of the rights set out in
the Convention. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, established under art. 43 of the
Convention, studies the States' reports and makes official commentaries available. The report
entitled "Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Canada" was
adopted by the Committee at its 233d meeting, held 9 June 1995.
171 Ibid., para 13 (Le, reference to Committee on the Rights of the Child report) [emphasis
added].
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context. In particular, the Committee recommended that "[s]olutions be
sought to avoid expulsions causing the separation of families, in the
spirit of article 9 of the Convention." In addition, the Committee
recommended that Canada
pay particular attention to the implementation of article 22 of the Convention as well as of the
general priciples of the Convention, in particular the best interests of the child and respect for
his or her views, in all matters relating to the protection of refugees and immigrant children,
including in deportation proceedings.172
The recommentations made by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child suggest that, in the deportation context, Canada is not meeting its
international obligations to protect families and children. The
Committee's comments therefore support the basic position advanced in
this article. That is, in order to meet its obligations at international law,
in respect of the family and child, Canada should better protect
domiciled aliens who are facing deportation. As already indicated, the
protection afforded by the Canadian State should be constitutional in
nature and based on the recognition of substantive Charter rights.
Moreover, to assist in the interpretation of these rights, the
jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, namely Europe and Australia, is
instructive.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this analysis, the "international" character of the
deportation power was asserted. At the end of the analysis, which has
canvassed the interests on the part of both the deportee and the
expelling State, it is important to further recognize the interests of the
State of origin of the expelled alien. As Oppenheim indicates, the State
receiving the expelled alien, "by virtue of its right of protection over
nationals abroad"173 can make diplomatic representations to the
deporting State in order to obtain reasons for the deportation.174 The
accountability of the deporting State to other States for unjust or
arbitrary expulsions further supports this article's scrutiny of
questionable deportation orders in respect of domiciled aliens.
Parts IV and V emphasize the interests of the domiciled alien with
regard to the State in which the alien has resided for some time. The
172 Ibid., para. 24.
173 Oppenheim, supra note 4 at 943.
174 Ibid. at 943-44.
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terms "participation," ".membership," and "integration" are used to
characterize the substantial connections the alien has developed with the
expelling State. Family connections, in particular, give rise to special
protections under the principles of fundamental justice, enshrined in the
Charter, and under international human rights treaties, to which Canada
is a Party. Nonetheless, the characterization of exactly what interests are
at stake is a complex task, which one European commentator
summarizes as follows:
Ayant conserv6 la nationalit6 de leur P-tat d'origine et menac6s d'une mesure d'6loignement, ces
derniers lies immigr6s dits de ]a '<seconde g6n~ration>(] sont susceptibles d'invoquer leur droit h
mener une vie familiale normale pour y 6chapper. I1 est permis de penser qu'en r6alit6 ils
mettent moins en avant leur vie en famille que leur situation personnelle, risultant d'une
immersion complete dans la soci6t6 de l'Etat d'accueil et d'une rupture quasi complete, mis A
part le lien de nationalit6, avee un ttat d'origine dont ils ignorent tout, de ]a langue 5 ]a culture
ou aux moeurs. A la chami~re de la vie familiale ... et de la vie prive ... il y a 1h une
probl6matique lourde de conflits potentiels et qui n'est malheureusement pas pros de
dispara7itre.175
Although these comments are made in the context of the ECHR, they
equally apply to the Canadian context and help conceptualize the
deportation of domiciled aliens, or "6trangers int6gr6s,"1 76 as
banishment, in every sense of the word.
In order to adequately protect the dignity and inherent worth of all
aliens, and in particular of those facing deportation, it is imperative that
new arguments be advanced before the courts. These arguments are
based on a growing body of international law which recognizes the need
to protect families and children in the face of deportation proceedings.
Indeed, unjustified interference with a domiciled alien's private and
family life should give rise to a cause of action against the expelling
State. In Canada, the plaintiff alien can invoke the Charter, in
conjunction with customary and conventional international law, to argue
that deportation is unconstitutional. Moreover, the mere novelty of the
deportee's action, as against the expelling State, should not act as a legal
barrier.17 7 Rather, the development of the law, on both domestic and
175 Labayle, supra note 104 at 522.
176 Beldjoudi, supra note 158 at 36, Marten J.
177 See, for example, Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 at 980, where Wilson J.
wrote:
As in England, if there is a chance that the plaintiff might succeed, then the plaintiff
should not be "driven from the judgment seat." Neither the length and complexity of the
issues, the novelty of the cause of action, nor the potential for the defendant to present a
strong defence should prevent the plaintiff from proceeding with his or her case.
This passage was cited with approval by Cory J. in Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada
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international levels, is encouraged when national courts, and legislators,
are persuaded to consider progressive norms of customary and
conventional international law. In short, "the construction of a
comprehensive international human rights regime protecting aliens ... is
an art as well as a science, one in which the skills of imaginative
advocates are as important as the work of enlightened draftsmen."178
(Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 at 257.
178 R.B. Lillich, The human rights of aliens in contemporary international law (Oxford:
Manchester University Press, 1984) at 98.
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